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Abstract. Quantum message authentication codes are families of keyed encoding and decoding maps
that enable the detection of tampering on encoded quantum data. Here, we study a new class of
simulators for quantum message authentication schemes, and show how they are applied in the context
of two codes: the Clifford and the trap code. Our results show for the first time that these codes admit
an efficient simulation (assuming that the adversary is efficient). Such efficient simulation is typically
crucial in order to establish a composable notion of security.
1 Introduction
Quantum cryptography is the study of the security of information processing in a quantum world.
While quantum key distribution [BB84] is today the most widely successful quantum cryptographic
technology [BEM+07,Feh10], quantum information effectively re-defines many cryptographic para-
digms [BS16]. Among these is the need for new definitions and protocols for cryptographic tasks
that operate on quantum data, such as quantum secret sharing [CGL99] and quantum multi-party
computation [BCG+06]. Another fundamental task is quantum message authentication.
Quantum message authentication schemes, introduced in [BCG+02], are families of keyed en-
coding and decoding maps which allow for the detection of tampering on encoded quantum data.
These codes were originally given in a very efficient form, based on purity testing [BCG+02], and
were shown to also satisfy a composable security notion [HLM11].
Further quantum message authentication schemes have been proposed, including the signed
polynomial code[BCG+06,ABE10], the trap code [BGS13] and the Clifford code [ABE10,DNS12].
These schemes have a nice algebraic form, which makes them particularly easy to study. Perhaps
the main reason for interest in these schemes is that they have a sufficient amount of “structure”
to enable evaluation of quantum gates over the encoded data (this technique is called quantum
computing on authenticated data (QCAD)). This has lead to protocols for multi-party quantum
computation[BCG+06], quantum one-time programs [BGS13] and the verification of quantum com-
putations [ABE10].
The security of quantum message authentication schemes is typically defined in terms of the
existence of a simulator that, given access only to the ideal functionality for quantum message
authentication (which is a virtual device that either transmits the quantum data directly and
outputs “accept”, or replaces it with a dummy state and outputs “reject”), is able to emulate the
behaviour of the adversary so that the real-world protocol (involving the adversary) is statistically
indistinguishable from the ideal-world protocol (involving the simulator). This type of definition
fits in the quantum Universal Composability (UC)[Can01,Unr10] framework, as long as we add
a further condition: if the adversary runs in polynomial time, so must the simulator (an efficient
simulation). Until now, direct efficient simulations were known only for the purity-testing based
codes [BCG+02].
In this work, we show a new family of efficient simulators for quantum message authentication
schemes. The main idea is that the simulator replaces the entire codeword by half-EPR pairs
(keeping the remaining half to itself), and runs the adversary on these entangled states (as well as
the reference system for the original input). After the attack is applied, the simulator performs Bell
basis measurements in order to verify the integrity of the EPR pairs. So long as enough EPR pairs
are found to be intact, the simulator makes the ideal functionality “accept”; otherwise, it makes
it “reject”. It is well-known that this Bell basis measurement will detect any non-identity Pauli
attack—given the structure of the codes that we analyze, we show that this is sufficient.
We apply this type of simulator to the Clifford and trap quantum message authentication
codes. We note that the Clifford code was previously proven secure according to an algebraic
definition, without an efficient simulation [ABE10,DNS12], and that the trap scheme was proven
secure according to a simulator for a more elaborate ideal functionality for quantum one-time
programs [BGS13]. We thus establish for the first time efficient simulators for these codes (note,
however, that we make extensive use of the algebraic tools developed in these prior works, and that
we achieve the same security bounds). We also note that the idea of using EPR-pair testing as
a proof technique for quantum message authentication has appeared in [BCG+02], where a more
elaborate type of testing (called purity testing) is used.
Roadmap. The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we give some details
on the standard notation and well-known facts that are used throughout. In Section 3, we formally
define quantum message authentication in terms of correctness and security. Section 4 gives the
Clifford and trap schemes, while in Section 5 we show security of the schemes.
2 Preliminaries
Here, we present basic notation (Section 2.1) and well-known facts about the Pauli (Section 2.2)
and Clifford (Section 2.3) groups.
2.1 Basic Notation
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics of quantum information [NC00], but nevertheless
give a quick review of the most relevant notation in this section. We will use the density operator
formalism to represent quantum states. Density matrices are represented with a greek letter, typi-
cally ρ. The subscripts of the quantum states indicate which spaces (registers) the states reside in.
We therefore represent the density operator for the state in the M register as ρM .
The trace norm of a state, ρ, denoted ‖ρ‖1, is defined as ‖ρ‖1 = tr[
√
ρ†ρ]. The trace distance
between two states ρ and σ, denoted D(ρ, σ), is defined as D(ρ, σ) = 12 ‖ρ− σ‖1. The trace distance
is a measure of distiguishability between the two states ρ and σ. The trace distance is equal to 0 if
and only if ρ and σ are the same state (and therefore indistinguishable) and the trace distance is
equal to 1 if and only if ρ and σ are orthogonal (and therefore perfectly distinguishable). The trace
norm, and therefore the trace distance, satisfies the triangle inequality: ‖ρ+ σ‖1 ≤ ‖ρ‖1 + ‖σ‖1.
Let B(H) be the space of bounded linear operators acting on a Hilbert space, H. Given A ⊆
B(H1) and B ⊆ B(H2) then given a linear map T from A→ B, T is called positive if T (A) ≥ 0 for
all positive A ∈ A. T is a completely positive map, (CP map), if T ⊗ Id : A⊗B → B(H1)⊗B(C
n)
is positive for all n ∈ N. In this case, Id is the identity map on B(Cn) and Cn is isomorphic to
a complex Hilbert space of dimension n. A map, T , is trace preserving if tr(T (ρ)) = tr(ρ). T is a
quantum channel if it is a completely positive and trace preserving map (CPTP map). A family
of quantum maps is polynomial-time if they can be written as a polynomial-time uniform family
of quantum circuits. A quantum state is polynomial-time generated if it given as the output of a
polynomial-time quantum map (which takes as input the all-zeros state) [Wat11].
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A permutation map, denoted throughout by π, is a unitary operation that acts on n qubits
and permutes the order of the n qubits. This can equivalently be seen as a permutation, σ, of the
indices of the qubits, where π would take the ith qubit to the σ(i)th position. Permutation maps
are orthogonal, real valued matrices so π−1 = π†. We use Πn to denote the set of all permutation
maps on n qubits.
We denote a two-qubit maximally entangled pure state as |Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 + |11〉). This is
one of four Bell states. The other three Bell states are also maximally entangled pure states,
|Φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉), |Ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 + |10〉), and |Ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). The four Bell states
are orthogonal and form a basis for two-qubit states. The four Bell states are therefore perfectly
distinguishable and so we can perform a projective measurement into the Bell basis and determine
which of the four Bell states we have. This is called a Bell basis measurement.
An [[n, 1, d]]-code is a quantum error correcting code that encodes one logical qubit into n qubits
and has distance d; if d = 2t + 1, the code can correct up to t bit or phase flips. We assume that
the decoding map can always be applied, but if more than t errors are present, it is not guaranteed
to decode to the original input.
2.2 Pauli Matrices
The single-qubit Pauli matrices are given by:
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
,X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, and Y = iXZ =
[
0 −i
i 0
]
. (1)
Recall that if we allow complex coefficients, the any single-qubit gate can be written as a linear
combination of the four single-qubit Pauli matrices.
An n-qubit Pauli matrix is given by the n-fold tensor product of single-qubit Paulis. We denote
the set of all n-qubit Pauli matrices by Pn, where |Pn| = 4
n. Any n-qubit unitary operator, U , can
also be written as a linear combination of n-qubit Paulis, again allowing for complex coefficients.
This gives U =
∑
P∈Pn αPP , with
∑
P∈Pn |αP |
2 = 1, since U is unitary. This is called the Pauli
decomposition of a unitary quantum operation.
The Pauli weight of an n-qubit Pauli, denoted ω(P ), is the number of non-identity Paulis in the
n-fold tensor product. We will also define sets of Paulis composed only of specific Pauli matrices,
such as {I,X}⊗n which is the set of all n-qubit Paulis composed of only I and X Paulis, or
{I, Z}⊗n which is the set of all n-qubit Paulis composed of only I and Z Paulis. Finally, Paulis are
self-inverses, so P = P−1 = P †.
The following lemma, called the Pauli Twirl [DCEL09], shows how we can greatly simplify
expressions that involve the twirling of an operation by the Pauli matrices:
Lemma 2.1 (Pauli Twirl). Let P,P ′ be Pauli operators. Then for any ρ it holds that:
1
|Pn|
∑
Q∈Pn
Q†PQρQ†P ′†Q =
{
0, P 6= P ′
PρP †, otherwise .
2.3 Clifford Group
The Clifford group, Cn, on n qubits are unitaries that map Pauli matrices to Pauli matrices (up to a
phase of ±1 or ±i). Specifically, if P ∈ Pn, then for all C ∈ Cn, αCPC
† ∈ Pn, for some α ∈ {±1,±i}.
Not only do Cliffords map Paulis to Paulis, but they do so with a uniform distribution [ABE10]:
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Lemma 2.2 (Clifford Randomization). Let P be a non-identity Pauli operator. Applying a
random Clifford operator (by conjugation) maps it to a Pauli operator chosen uniformly over all
non-identity Pauli operators. More formally, for every P , Q ∈ Pn \ {I}, it holds that:
∣∣∣{C ∈ Cn|C†PC = Q}∣∣∣ = |Cn|
|Pn| − 1
.
We also state a lemma that is analogous to the Pauli twirl, the Clifford Twirl [DCEL09]; for
completeness, the proof is given in Appendix A.
Lemma 2.3 (Clifford Twirl). Let P 6= P ′ be Pauli operators. For any ρ it holds that:
∑
C∈Cn
C†PCρC†P ′C = 0.
Finally, we note that sampling a uniformly random Clifford can be done efficiently [Got97].
3 Quantum Message Authentication
Following [DNS12], we define a quantum message authentication scheme as a pair of encoding and
decoding maps that satisfy the following:
Definition 1 (Quantum message authentication scheme) A quantum message authentica-
tion scheme is a polynomial-time set of encoding and decoding channels {(EM→Ck ,D
C→MF
k ) | k ∈ K},
where K is the set of possible keys, M is the input system, C is the encoded system, and F
is a flag system that is spanned by two orthogonal states: |acc〉 and |rej〉, such that for all ρM ,
(Dk ◦ Ek)(ρM ) = ρM ⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|.
In order to define security for a quantum message authentication scheme, we first consider a
reference system R, so that the input can be described as ρMR and we can furthermore assume
that the system consisting of the encoded message, together with the reference system, undergoes
a unitary adversarial attack UCR. For a fixed key, k, we thus define the real-world channel as:
Ek
MR→MRF : ρMR 7→ (Dk ⊗ IR)(UCR(Ek ⊗ IR)(ρMR)U
†
CR), (2)
where IR is the identity map on the reference system, R. From now on, we will not include the
identity maps, since it will be clear from context which system undergoes a linear map and which
one does not.
Security is given in terms of the existence of a simulator, which has access only to the ideal
functionality. This ideal functionality either accepts (and leaves the message register M intact), or
rejects (and outputs a fixed state ΩM ); the simulator can interact with the ideal functionality by
selecting accept or reject. In both cases, the simulator can also alter the reference system R. This
ideal-world process is modeled by the quantum channel F , called the ideal channel, where for each
attack, UCR, there exists two CP maps U
acc and U rej acting only on the reference system R such
that U acc + U rej = 1:
F
MR→MRF : ρMR → (1M ⊗U accR )ρMR ⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|+ trM ((1M ⊗U
rej
R )ρMR)ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| .
(3)
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Definition 2 (Security of quantum message authentication) Let
{(EM→Ck ,D
C→MF
k ) | k ∈ K} be a quantum message authentication scheme, with keys k chosen from
K. Then the scheme is ǫ-secure if for all attacks, there exists a simulator such that:
D
( 1
|K|
∑
k∈K
Ek(ρMR),F (ρMR)
)
≤ ǫ,∀ρMR. (4)
Furthermore, we require that if Ek is polynomial-time in the size of the input register M , then F
is also polynomial-time in the size of the input register, M .
We note that this definition is similar to the definition in [DNS12]; however we require a
polynomial-time simulation whenever the attack is polynomial-time. This does not limit the proof
to polynomial-time attacks, but merely restricts the simulator to have at most the complexity of the
attack. This condition being satisfied is typically a crucial ingredient in order for the composability
to carry through [Unr10].
4 Quantum Message Authentication Schemes
Here, we present two quantum message authentication schemes, the Clifford code (Section 4.1) and
the trap code (Section 4.2). The two encoding procedures both proceed by appending trap qubits
(in a fixed state) to the message register, and then twirling by a Clifford (for the Clifford code) or
a Pauli (for the trap code). The trap code also has a permutation in addition to the Pauli twirl
acting on the message register. Decoding simply consists of undoing the permutation in the trap
code and then in both cases measuring the traps to check for any sign of tampering. In the case of
the Clifford code, only one set of traps (all in the same state) is needed because the Clifford twirl
breaks any Pauli attack into a uniform mixture of Paulis which is detected on the traps with high
probability. The trap code, however, relies on two sets of traps (in two different states) with both
a Pauli twirl and a permutation of the message and trap qubits. Furthermore, the trap scheme
requires that we first encode the input message into an error correcting code (essentially, this is
because the Pauli twirl is not as powerful as the Clifford twirl and will catch only high-weight Pauli
attacks with the error correcting code taking care of the low-weight ones).
4.1 The Clifford Code
We define a message authentication scheme using a Clifford encryption as follows:
1. The encoding, EM→Ck , takes as input an n-qubit message in the M system; it appends an
additional d-qubit trap register in the state |0〉 〈0|⊗d. A uniformly random Clifford is then
applied to the resulting n + d-qubit register, according to the key, k. The output register is
called C.
Mathematically, the encoding, EM→Ck , indexed by a secret key, k, on input ρM (where Ck the
kth Clifford) is given by:
Ek : ρM 7→ Ck(ρM ⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)C†k. (5)
2. The decoding, DC→MFk , takes the C register and applies the inverse Clifford, according to the
key, k. The last d qubits are then measured in the computational basis. If this measurement
returns |0〉 〈0|⊗d then an additional qubit |acc〉 〈acc| is appended in the flag system, F . If the
measurements return anything else, then the remaining system, M , is traced out and replaced
with a fixed n-qubit state, ΩM , and an additional qubit, |rej〉 〈rej|, is appended in the flag
system.
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Mathematically, the decoding, DC→MFk , also indexed by the secret key, k, is given by:
Dk : ρC 7→ tr0(PaccC
†
k(ρC)CkP
†
acc)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|+ trM,0(PrejC
†
k(ρC)CkP
†
rej)ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| ,
(6)
where Pacc = 1
⊗n⊗|0〉 〈0|⊗d and Prej = 1⊗(n+d)−Pacc are measurement projectors representing
the trap qubits being in their initial states or altered, respectively. Finally, tr0 refers to the trace
over the d trap qubits.
4.2 The Trap Code
We define a trap code message authentication scheme as follows:
1. The encoding, EM→Ck , takes as input ρM and applies an [[n, 1, d]]-error correcting code to the
single-qubit M register, which will correct up to t errors (where d = 2t + 1). It then appends
two additional n-qubit trap registers, the first in the state |0〉 〈0|⊗n and the second in the state
|+〉 〈+|⊗n. The resulting 3n-qubit register is then permuted and a Pauli encryption is applied,
according to the key, k. The resulting register is called C.
Mathematically the encoding, EM→Ck , indexed by a two-part secret key k = (k1, k2) is given by:
Ek : ρM 7→ Pk2πk1(EncM (ρM )⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗n ⊗ |+〉 〈+|⊗n)π†k1Pk2 , (7)
where EncM (ρM ) represents the input state after the error correcting code has been applied to
the M system, πk1 is the k
th
1 permutation and Pk2 is the k
th
2 Pauli matrix.
We note that we use the error-correcting properties of the code only (it is sufficient in our
context to simply correct low-weight Paulis on the message, as opposed detecting them and
rejecting).
2. The decoding, DC→MFk , takes the C register and applies the inverse Pauli and then the inverse
permutation according to the key, k. The last n qubits are then measured in the Hadamard basis
and the second last n qubits are measured in the computational basis. If these two measurements
return |+〉 〈+|⊗n and |0〉 〈0|⊗n respectively, then an additional qubit |acc〉 〈acc| is appended in
the flag system F and the resulting M register is decoded (according to the error correcting
code applied in the encoding). If the measurements return anything else, then the remaining
systemM is traced out and replaced with a fixed single-qubit state ΩM and an additional qubit,
|rej〉 〈rej|, is appended in the flag system.
Define PE = {P ⊗R⊗Q|P ∈ Pn, R ∈ {I, Z}
⊗n, Q ∈ {I,X}⊗n}. Then define the measurement
projector corresponding to the protocol accepting as Pacc = 1
⊗n ⊗ |0〉 〈0|⊗n ⊗ |+〉 〈+|⊗n. The
accepted states are then the states that can be achieved by applying any P ∈ PE to ρM ⊗
|0〉 〈0|⊗n ⊗ |+〉 〈+|⊗n. We define Prej = 1⊗3n −Pacc, the measurement projector corresponding
to the protocol rejecting, where the states achieved by applying any P ∈ P3n\PE to EncM (ρM )⊗
|0〉 〈0|⊗n ⊗ |+〉 〈+|⊗n are rejected.
Mathematically, the decoding, DC→MFk , also indexed by the two-part secret key, k, is given by:
Dk : ρC 7→ DecM tr0,+(Paccπ
†
k1
Pk2(ρC)Pk2πk1P
†
acc)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM,0,+(Prejπ
†
k1
Pk2(ρC)Pk2πk1P
†
acc)ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| , (8)
where DecM is the decoding of the error correcting code applied in the encryption and tr0,+
refers to the trace over the last two sets of n trap qubits.
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5 Security of Quantum Message Authentication Schemes
In this section, we present simulation-based proofs for the Clifford (Section 5.1) and the trap
(Section 5.2) codes. At a high level, the security of the two codes is analyzed in very similar ways
(see the discussion in Section 1). The main idea (in both cases) is to use a simulator that replaces
the encoded message in C with half EPR pairs, without encryption in the Clifford code, and with
only a permutation in the trap code; the attack is then applied to these half EPR pairs, as well
as any reference system R. From there we are able to compare the accepted and rejected states
between the real world and ideal protocols in order to find the upper bound for the trace distance
between them. We will notice that these differences are the cases where the real world protocol
accepts something that the simulator rejects. Specifically, this is where an attack gets through
and changes a logical qubit but is not detected in the traps. Of course, these same states are not
rejected by the real world protocol but they are rejected by the simulator. Because the Clifford twirl
maps any non-identity Pauli attack to a uniform mixture of non-identity Paulis, the bound for this
distance is simple to compute in the case of the Clifford code. In the case of the trap code, a more
complicated argument is needed based on permuting the attack and a combinatorial argument that
bounds the undetected attacks that can alter the logical data.
5.1 Security of the Clifford Code
Simulator. Recall (Section 3) that the simulator interacts with the ideal functionality by only
altering the reference system and selecting either accept or reject. Given the attack, UCR, to which
the simulator has access, the simulator will apply the attack to half EPR pairs in place of the C
system and then perform a Bell basis measurement on the EPR pairs. It will select accept if the
EPR pairs are still in their original state, and reject otherwise. Let PUacc = 1MR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
and PUrej = 1− P
U
acc. The ideal channel is then:
F
MR→MRF : ρMR →
trC1C2(P
U
accUC1R(ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
)U †C1RP
U †
acc )⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM (trC1C2(P
U
rejUC1R(ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
)U †C1RP
U †
rej ))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| . (9)
According to the above, we define U acc and U rej that satisfy Eq. (3) as:
U
acc : ρR → trC1C2(P
U
accUC1R(ρR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
)U †C1RP
U †
acc ), (10)
and
U
rej : ρR → trC1C2(P
U
rejUC1R(ρR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
)U †C1RP
U †
rej ). (11)
For a fixed attack UCR =
∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R , with
∑
P∈Pn+d
|αP |
2 = 1, we note the effects of
U acc and U rej, recalling, of course, that U acc(ρMR) is understood to be (1M ⊗U
acc)(ρMR), with
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the same understanding for U rej:
U
acc(ρMR) = trC1C2(P
U
accUC1R(ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
)U †C1RP
U †
acc )
= |α1|
2 (1M ⊗ U
1
R)ρMR(1M ⊗ U
1†
R ) (12)
U
rej(ρMR) = trC1C2(P
U
rej
(∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2 PC1 ⊗ U
P
R
)
(ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗(n+d)
C1C2
)
(∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2 PC1 ⊗ U
P †
R
)
PU †rej )
=
∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2 (1M ⊗ U
P
R )(ρMR)(1M ⊗ U
P †
R ). (13)
We are now ready to state and prove our main theorem on the security of the Clifford message
authentication scheme.
Theorem 5.1. Let {(ES→Ck ,D
C→SF
k ) | k ∈ K} be the Clifford quantum message authentication
scheme, with parameter d. Then the Clifford code is an ǫ-secure quantum authentication scheme,
for ǫ ≤ 3
2d
.
Proof. We will follow the proof structure used in [DNS12,ABE10].
Using the simulator described above, we wish to show that:
D
( 1
|K|
∑
k∈K
Ek(ρMR),F (ρMR)
)
≤ ǫ,∀ρMR. (14)
Consider a general attack UCR, written as UCR =
∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R where
∑
P∈Pn+d
|αP |
2 = 1.
The real-world channel is then represented as:
Ek
MR→MRF : ρMR 7→ Dk
(( ∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R
)
Ek(ρMR)
( ∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P †
R
))
. (15)
We will use ψ = ρMR⊗|0〉 〈0|
⊗d to simplify the following expressions. Consider the effect of the
real protocol on input ρMR with attack
∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R , conditioned on acceptance:
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
tr0
(
PaccC
†
k
( ∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗U
P
R
)
(CkψC
†
k)
( ∑
P∈Pn+d
αPP
†
C ⊗U
P †
R
)
CkP
†
acc
)
⊗|acc〉 〈acc| .
(16)
Now we can apply the Clifford Twirl (Lemma 2.3), since the sum over all keys is, of course, the
sum over all Cliffords (since the keys index all n+ d-qubit Cliffords) and then simply split the sum
over all Paulis into the case with the identity Pauli from the attack, and all other Paulis. What we
are left with is:
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
tr0
( ∑
P∈Pn+d
|αP |
2 PaccC
†
k(PC ⊗ U
P
R )(CkψC
†
k)(P
†
C ⊗ U
P †
R )CkP
†
acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
=
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
tr0
(
|α1|
2 PaccC
†
k(1C ⊗ U
1
R)(CkψC
†
k)(1C ⊗ U
1†
R )CkP
†
acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
tr0
(∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2 PaccC
†
k(PC ⊗ U
P
R )(CkψC
†
k)(P
†
C ⊗ U
P †
R )CkP
†
acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc| . (17)
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Clearly the first term is exactly what the simulator will accept, and the second term is in exactly
the right form to use a Clifford Randomization (Lemma 2.2), resulting in:
= U acc(ρMR)⊗+
1
|Cn|
tr0
(∑
P˜ 6=1
∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2 |Cn|
|Pn| − 1
Pacc(P˜C⊗U
P
R )ψ(P˜
†
C⊗U
P †
R )P
†
acc
)
⊗|acc〉 〈acc| .
(18)
The P˜ s are the results of the Clifford Randomization applied to a Pauli, P . The randomization is
not applied to the reference system, so the UPR terms are not changed by the randomization. We
can use the properties of the trace to move the trace inside the first sum, and we can move the
|Cn|
|Pn|−1 coefficient out of both of the sums:
= U acc(ρMR)⊗|acc〉 〈acc|+
1
|Cn|
|Cn|
|Pn| − 1
(∑
P˜ 6=1
tr0
∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2Pacc(P˜C⊗U
P
R )ψ(P˜
†
C⊗U
P †
R )P
†
acc
)
⊗|acc〉 〈acc| .
(19)
We recognize the R register in the second sum as the states that the simulator will reject. Recall that
the simulator is in terms of the sum over all non-identity Paulis and includes the αP coefficients.
We can therefore write the previous line in terms of the simulator as:
= U acc(ρMR)⊗|acc〉 〈acc|+
1
|Pn+d| − 1
(∑
P˜ 6=1
tr0Pacc(P˜C(U
rej(ρMR)⊗|0〉 〈0|
⊗d)P˜ †C)P
†
acc
)
⊗|acc〉 〈acc| .
(20)
If we let Pt be the set of all Paulis that do not alter the trap qubits, then when we apply Pacc
to the above, we end up with the sum over the P˜ ∈ Pt \ {1}. Therefore the previous line can be
simplified to:
= U acc(ρMR)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|+
1
|Pn+d| − 1
∑
P˜∈Pt\{1}
tr0(P˜C(U
rej(ρMR)⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)P˜ †C)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc| .
(21)
The effect of the real protocol on input ρMR with attack
∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R , conditioned on
rejection, can be manipulated in the same way:
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
(
trM,0
(
PrejC
†
k
( ∑
P∈Pn+d
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R
)
(Ck(ψ)C
†
k)
( ∑
P∈Pn+d
αPP
†
C ⊗ U
P †
R
)
CkP
†
rej
))
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
=
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
(
trM,0(|α1|
2 PrejC
†
k(1C ⊗ U
1
R)(Ck(ψ)C
†
k)(1C ⊗ U
1†
R )CkP
†
rej)
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
+
1
|K|
∑
kǫK
(
trM,0
(∑
P 6=1
|αP |
2 PrejC
†
k(PC ⊗ U
P
R )(Ck(ψ)C
†
k)(P
†
C ⊗ U
P †
R )CkP
†
rej
))
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
=
1
|Pn+d| − 1
∑
P˜ 6=1
∑
P 6=1
|α|2
(
trM,0(Pacc(P˜C ⊗ U
P
R )(ψ)(P˜
†
C ⊗ U
P †
R )P
†
acc)
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
= trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| −
1
|Pn+d| − 1
trM
( ∑
P∈Pt\{1}
U
rej(ρMR)
)
ΩM |rej〉 〈rej|
= trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| −
4n2d − 1
|Pn+d| − 1
trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| . (22)
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When we combine the accepted states and the rejected states into the real world protocol given by
Eq. (15), we can write it in terms of the simulator as:
Dk(UCREk(ρMR)U
†
CR)
=U acc(ρMR)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|+
1
|Pn+d| − 1
∑
P˜∈Pt\{1}
tr0(P˜C(U
rej(ρMR)⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)P˜ †C)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| −
4n2d − 1
|Pn+d| − 1
trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| . (23)
We can therefore write Eq. (14) as:
1
2
∥∥∥U acc(ρMR)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|+ 1
|Pn+d| − 1
∑
P˜∈Pt\{1}
tr0(P˜C(U
rej(ρMR)⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)P˜ †C)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM(U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| −
4n2d − 1
|Pn+d| − 1
trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
− (U acc(ρMR)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|+ trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|)
∥∥∥
1
=
1
2
∥∥∥ 1
|Pn+d| − 1
∑
P˜∈Pt\{1}
tr0(P˜C(U
rej(ρMR)⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗d)P˜ †C)⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
−
4n2d − 1
|Pn+d| − 1
trM (U
rej(ρMR))ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
∥∥∥
1
(24)
Since |Pt \ {1}| = 4
n2d − 1, and the maximum trace distance between two states is 1, we can see
that by the triangle inequality, the above is bounded by:
≤
4n2d − 1
|Pn+d| − 1
=
4n2d − 1
4n+d − 1
=
1− 1
4n2d
2d − 1
4n2d
≤ 3×
1
2d
. (25)
This concludes the proof, showing that the Clifford code is 3
2d
-secure. ⊓⊔
This is identical to the bound of 6
2d
achieved in [DNS12] when we consider that we use the trace
distance in our definition of security, and [DNS12] uses the trace norm, which differs from the trace
distance by a factor of 2.
5.2 Security of the Trap Code
Simulator. Recall (Section 3) that the simulator interacts with the ideal functionality by only
altering the reference system and selecting either accept or reject. Given the attack, UCR, to which
the simulator has access, the simulator will apply the attack to randomly permuted half EPR pairs
in place of the C system and then de-permute the EPR pairs and perform a Bell basis measurement.
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It will select accept if the first n of the EPR pairs have ≤ t errors, the next n of the EPR pairs are
either unchanged or have phase flip errors, and the last n of the EPR pairs are either unchanged
or have bit flip errors. It will select reject otherwise. Let PF = {P ⊗R⊗Q|P ∈ Pn, ω(P ) ≤ t, R ∈
{I, Z}⊗n, Q ∈ {I,X}⊗n}. Specifically, PF is the set of all Paulis that the ideal protocol will accept
being applied to the half EPR pair—Paulis that would apply at most t non-identity Paulis on the
message space and would not alter the |0〉 〈0|⊗n or the |+〉 〈+|⊗n traps in the real world protocol.
Finally, define the measurement projector corresponding to the simulator selecting accept as:
PUacc =
∑
Q∈{I,X}⊗n
∑
R∈{I,Z}⊗n
∑
P∈Pn|ω(P )≤t
1MR ⊗ (P ⊗R⊗Q)C1
|Φ+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗3n
C1C2
(P ⊗R⊗Q)C1
=
∑
P∈PF
1MR ⊗ (PC1 |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗3n
C1C2
P †C1), (26)
and the measurement projector corresponding to the simulator selecting reject as:
PUrej = 1−P
U
acc. (27)
The ideal channel with attack UC1R is therefore:
F
MR→MRF : (28)
ρMR → trC1C2
1
|Π3n|
∑
π∈Π3n
(
PUaccπ
†
C1
UC1RπC1(ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗3n
C1C2
)π†C1U
†
C1R
πC1P
U †
acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
(
trC1C2
1
|Π3n|
∑
π∈Π3n
(
PUrejπ
†
C1
UC1RπC1(ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗3n
C1C2
)π†C1U
†
C1R
πC1P
U †
rej
))
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej| .
For a fixed attack UCR =
∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R , with
∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 = 1 and where for the sake of
brevity we will represent ρMR ⊗ |Φ
+〉 〈Φ+|
⊗3n
C1C2
with φMRC1C2 , the ideal channel becomes:
F
MR→MRF : ρMR → (29)
trC1C2
1
|Π3n|
∑
π∈Π3n
(
PUaccπ
†
C1
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC1 ⊗ U
P
R
)
πC1φMRC1C2π
†
C1
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC1 ⊗ U
P †
R
)
πC1P
U †
acc ⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
(
PUrejπ
†
C1
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC1 ⊗ U
P
R
)
πC1φMRC1C2π
†
C1
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC1 ⊗ U
P †
R
)
πC1P
U †
rej
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
.
From here we will move the permutations to act on the attack Paulis, since they’re all applied to
the same register, C1:
=trC1C2
1
|Π3n|
(30)
∑
π∈Π3n
((
PUacc
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPπ
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R
)
φMRC1C2
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPπ
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R
)
PU †acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
(
PUrej
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPπ
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R
)
φMRC1C2
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPπ
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R
)
PU †rej
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
.
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Finally we apply the projectors:
=trC1C2
1
|Π3n|∑
π∈Π3n
(( ∑
P |π†Pπ∈PF
|αP |
2 (π†C1PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R )(φMRC1C2)(π
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
( ∑
P |π†Pπ/∈PF
|αP |
2 (π†C1PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R )(φMRC1C2)(π
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
.
(31)
We are now ready to present our main theorem on the security of the trap code:
Theorem 5.2. Let {(ES→Ck ,D
C→SF
k ) | k ∈ K} be the trap quantum message authentication scheme
with parameter t, the number of bit or phase flip errors that the error correcting code applied to the
input message qubit can correct. Then the trap code is an ǫ-secure quantum message authentication
scheme, for ǫ ≤ (13 )
t+1.
Proof. Using the simulator described above, we wish to show that:
D
( 1
|K|
∑
k∈K
Ek(ρMR),F (ρMR)
)
≤ ǫ,∀ρMR. (32)
Consider a general attack UCR, written as UCR =
∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R with
∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 = 1. Let
ψ = EncM (ρMR)⊗ |0〉 〈0|
⊗n ⊗ |+〉 〈+|⊗n. The real-world channel is then represented as:
Ek
MR→MRF : ρMR 7→ Dk
(( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R
)
Ek(ρMR)
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P †
R
))
(33)
=
1
|K|
tr0,+
∑
kǫK
(
DecM
(
Paccπ
†
k1
Pk2
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R
)
Pk2πk1ψ
π†k1Pk2
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P †
R
)
Pk2πk1P
†
acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
(
Prejπ
†
k1
Pk2
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P
R
)
(Pk2πk1ψπ
†
k1
Pk2)
( ∑
P∈P3n
αPPC ⊗ U
P †
R
)
Pk2πk1P
†
rej
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
.
From here we apply the Pauli Twirl (Lemma 2.1):
=
1
|K1|
tr0,+
∑
k1ǫK1
(
DecM
(
Paccπ
†
k1
( ∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 (PC ⊗ U
P
R )πk1ψπ
†
k1
(PC ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
πk1P
†
acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
(
Prejπ
†
k1
( ∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 (PC ⊗ U
P
R )πk1ψπ
†
k1
(PC ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
πk1P
†
rej
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
. (34)
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Since the permutations act on the same register as the attack Paulis, we can move the permutations
to be considered to be acting on the Paulis instead of the message and traps:
=
1
|K1|
tr0,+
∑
k1ǫK1
(
DecM
(
Pacc
( ∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 (π†k1PCπk1 ⊗ U
P
R )ψ(π
†
k1
PCπk1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
P†acc
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
(
Prej
( ∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 (π†k1PCπk1 ⊗ U
P
R )ψ(π
†
k1
PCπk1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
P†rej
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
. (35)
Finally we apply the projectors and notice that K1 = Π3n:
=
1
|Π3n|
tr0,+
∑
πǫΠ3n
(
DecM
( ∑
P |π†Pπ∈PE
|αP |
2 (π†PCπ ⊗ UPR )ψ(π
†PCπ ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
( ∑
P |π†Pπ∈P3n\PE
|αP |
2 (π†PCπ ⊗ UPR )ψ(π
†PCπ ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
. (36)
Then:
1
2
∥∥∥ 1
|K|
∑
k∈K
Ek(ρMR)−F (ρMR)
∥∥∥
1
(37)
=
1
2
∥∥∥ 1
|Π3n|
∑
πǫΠ3n
(
tr0,+
(
DecM
( ∑
P |π†Pπ∈PE
|αP |
2 (π†PCπ ⊗ UPR )ψ(π
†PCπ ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
+ trM
( ∑
P |π†Pπ∈P3n\PE
|αP |
2 (π†PCπ ⊗ UPR )ψ(π
†PCπ ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)
− trC1C2
( ∑
P |π†Pπ∈PF
|αP |
2 (π†C1PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R )(φMRC1C2)(π
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
− trMC1C2
( ∑
P |π†Pπ/∈PF
|αP |
2 (π†C1PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R )(φMRC1C2)(π
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)∥∥∥
1
.
We will subtract the accepted states in the ideal protocol from those accepted in the real protocol
and we will subtract the rejected states in the real protocol from the rejected states in the ideal
protocol. Note that PE \ PF = {P ⊗R⊗Q|P ∈ Pn, ω(P ) > t,R ∈ {I, Z}
⊗n, Q ∈ {I,X}⊗n}.
=
1
2
∥∥∥ 1
|Π3n|
∑
πǫΠ3n
∑
P |π†Pπ∈PE \PF
(
tr0,+
(
DecM (|αP |
2 (π†PCπ ⊗ UPR )ψ(π
†PCπ ⊗ U
P †
R ))
)
⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
− trMC1C2
(
|αP |
2 (π†C1PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R )(φMRC1C2)(π
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
)∥∥∥
1
. (38)
Here we will use the triangle inequality to remove the sums from the trace distance:
≤
1
2
1
|Π3n|
∑
π∈Π3n
∑
P |π†Pπ∈PE \PF
∥∥∥tr0,+(DecM (|αP |2 (π†PCπ ⊗ UPR )ψ(π†PCπ ⊗ UP †R )))⊗ |acc〉 〈acc|
− trMC1C2
(
|αP |
2 (π†C1PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P
R )(φMRC1C2)(π
†
C1
PC1πC1 ⊗ U
P †
R )
)
ΩM ⊗ |rej〉 〈rej|
∥∥∥
1
. (39)
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Since the maximum trace distance between two states is 1 we have:
≤
1
|Π3n|
∑
k1ǫK1
∑
P |π†Pπ∈PE \PF
|αP |
2 . (40)
Now if we let ηP be the number of permutations, π of P such that π
†Pπ ∈ PE \PF , then the above
can be written as:
=
1
|Π3n|
∑
P∈P3n
ηP × |αP |
2 . (41)
In Appendix B, we give a combinatorial Lemma (Lemma B.1), which gives us ηP ≤
(
n
t+1
)
(t +
1)!(3n − (t+ 1))!. Thus, since
∑
P∈P3n
|αP |
2 = 1, the above expression can be bounded by:
≤
1
(3n)!
×
(
n
t+ 1
)
(t+ 1)!(3n − (t+ 1))!
=
n∏
i=1
i
3n−t−1∏
i=1
i
n−t−1∏
i=1
i
3n∏
i=1
i
=
n∏
i=n−t
i
3n∏
i=3n−t
i
=
t∏
i=0
n− t+ i
3n− t+ i
≤
t∏
i=0
1
3
=
(1
3
)t+1
(42)
Therefore, D
(
1
|K|
∑
k∈K
Ek(ρMR),F (ρMR)
)
≤ (13)
t+1,∀ρMR. ⊓⊔
We note that this is very similar to the bound in [BGS13] of (23)
d/2: note that the trap code
in [BGS13] uses the error detection property of the code. Since a code of distance d can detect up
to d/2 errors, this bound is consistent with our bound of (13 )
t+1.
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A Proof of Lemma 2.3
For completeness, we provide a proof of the Clifford Twirl Lemma 2.3 (see also [DCEL09]).
Proof. We will follow the proof structure of [DCEL09], but simplify for our purposes. Since Pn is
a subgroup of Cn, then we know that the number of left cosets of Pn in Cn, or the index of Pn in
Cn, is given by:
[Cn : Pn] =
|Cn|
|Pn|
(43)
Then given a representative from each of the cosets, {C1, C2, . . . , C |Cn|
|Pn|
}, we can rewrite the sum
over all Cliffords as a double sum of the Paulis and the coset representatives as below. We note
that it does not matter which representative we choose, only that we have one from each of the
cosets, and that the indices on the C terms give which coset they came from:
∑
C∈Cn
C†PCρC†P ′C =
|Cn|
|Pn|∑
i=1
∑
R∈Pn
(CiR)
†PCiRρ(CiR)†P ′CiR
=
|Cn|
|Pn|∑
i=1
∑
R∈Pn
R†C†i PCiRρR
†C†i P
′CiR (44)
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Now since C†i PCi = Qi for some Qi ∈ Pn, and since if P 6= P
′ then Qi 6= Q′i, we can simplify our
expression to one that only involves Paulis:
=
|Cn|
|Pn|∑
i=1
∑
R∈Pn
R†QiRρR†Q′iR
=
|Cn|
|Pn|∑
i=1
0
= 0 (45)
by the Pauli Twirl (Lemma 2.1). ⊓⊔
B Combinatorial Lemma
Lemma B.1. For a fixed P ∈ P3n, let ηP denote the number of permutations π of P such that
π†Pπ ∈ PE \PF Then for all P :
ηP ≤
(
n
t+ 1
)
(t+ 1)!(3n − (t+ 1))! . (46)
An intuitive argument for the above lemma is that ηP can be upper-bounded by fixing a
Pauli P ∈ {I,X}3n of weight t+ 1. We show that a Pauli with greater weight will have ≤ ηP pos-
sible allowed permutations. To find the number of possible allowed permutations, we will consider
the first n positions, where we require at least t+ 1 non-identity Paulis (for a total of
( n
t+1
)
(t+ 1)!
permutations). The remaining positions are then simply permuted, since we have used all of the
non-identity Paulis already, contributing a multiplicative factor of (3n − (t + 1))! permutations.
This is formalized below (where we also consider general attack Paulis consisting of combinations
of X, Y and Z).
Proof. In order to find an upper bound for ηP , we look to find the Pauli, P , that has the largest
number of permutations, π, such that π†Pπ ∈ PE \PF .
For a Pauli P with ω(P ) = d, we write d = dx + dy + dz + x1 + y + z1 + x2 + z2 for values
dx, dy, dz , x1, y, z1, x2, z2 as follows:
1. dx, dy, dz where dx + dy + dz = t + 1. These are the t + 1 X, Y , and Z Paulis that must be
applied to the first n qubits for the Pauli to be in PE \ PF .
2. y where y+dy is the total number of Y Paulis in P and y are the additional Y Paulis applied to
the first n qubits. Note that Y Paulis cannot be applied to either set of traps without altering
them.
3. x1, x2 where x1 + x2 + dx is the total number of X Paulis in P and x1 are the additional X
Paulis applied to the first n qubits and x2 are the X Paulis applied to the |+〉 〈+|
⊗n traps.
4. z1, z2 where z1+ z2+ dz is the total number of Z Paulis in P and z1 are the additional Z Paulis
applied to the first n qubits and z2 are the Z Paulis applied to the |0〉 〈0|
⊗n traps.
Then the possible permutations on P are found by multiplying the following terms:
1.
( n
dx,dy,dz ,n−t−1
)
dx!dy!dz! Which is the number of ways to choose the required t+ 1 spots for the
minimum number of Paulis applied to the first n qubits, multiplied by the number of ways of
permuting each of the sets of X, Y , and Z Paulis. Note that this term simplifies to n!(n−t−1)! ,
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2.
(n−t−1
x1
)
x1!, the number of ways to apply x1 additional X Paulis to the first n qubits,
3.
(n−t−1−x1
y
)
y!, the number of ways to apply y additional Y Paulis to the first n qubits,
4.
(
n−t−1−x1−y
z1
)
z1!, the number of ways to apply z1 additional Z Paulis to the first n qubits,
5.
( n
x2
)
x2!, the number of ways to apply x2 X Paulis to the n traps that will not be changed by
them,
6.
(
n
z2
)
z2!, the number of ways to apply z2 Z Paulis to the n traps that will not be changed by
them, and
7. (3n − (dx + dy + dz + x1 + y + z1 + x2 + z2))! the number of ways to permute the remaining
identity qubits, which simplifies to (3n − d)!.
The product, once simplified, is then:
ηP =
n!n!n!(3n− d)!
(n− t− 1− x1 − y − z1)!(n − x2)!(n − z2)!
=
n∏
n−t−x1−y−z1
i
n∏
n−x2+1
i
n∏
n−z2+1
i
3n−t−1−x1−y−z1−x2−z2∏
i=1
i (47)
Since t is fixed, in order to maximize the above expression, we need to minimize x1, y, z1, x2, z2.
This is achieved by setting x1 = y = z1 = x2 = z2 = 0, and therefore d = t+ 1: we thus find that
ηP ≤
n∏
n−t
i
3n−t−1∏
i=1
i =
(
n
t+1
)
(t+ 1)!(3n − (t+ 1))!. ⊓⊔
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